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Two kinds of bad event
• Individual accidents: high frequency/low 
severity events—slips, trips, falls, bangs and 
knocks usually resulting in a few days 
absence from work (lost time injuries). 
• Organizational accidents: low 
frequency/high severity events—explosions, 
collisions, collapses, releases of toxic 
substances, etc. Is system vulnerability 
adequately assessed by LTIs?  NO!
Two ways of looking at human 
factors problems
• The PERSON approach
• The SYSTEM approach
Individual & organizational ax
have different causal sets
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personal protection
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Common ground:
Inadequate resources 
Poor safety culture 
Commercial pressures
The ‘Swiss cheese’ model
of accident causation
Some holes due
to active failures
Other holes due to
latent conditions
(resident ‘pathogens’)
Successive layers of defences, barriers, & safeguards
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Piper Alpha: Defensive failures
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Unsafe acts
• Slips, lapses, trips and fumbles
• Rule-based mistakes
• Knowledge-based mistakes
• Violations
 Routine
 Optimising
 Situational
Rule-related behaviours
• Correct compliance
• Mistaken compliance (mispliance)
• Malicious compliance (malpliance)
• Mistaken circumvention (misvention)
• Successful violation
• Mistaken improvisation
• Correct improvisation
Workplace factors
• Error factors
 Change of routine
 Poor interface
 Ambiguity
 Educational mismatch
 Negative transfer
 Poor S:N ratio
 Inadequate tools
 Etc.
• Violation factors
 Violations condoned
 Equipment problems
 Time pressure
 Unworkable procedures
 Supervisory example
 Easier way of working
 Poor tasking
 Etc.
Organizational factors
• Training
• Tools & equipment
• Materials
• Design
• Communication
• Procedures
• Pressures
• Maintenance
• Planning
• Managing operations
• Managing safety
• Managing change
• Budgeting
• Inspecting, etc.
Accident investigation steps
• What defenses failed (mode/function)?
• How did each defense fail? 
• Were there contributing unsafe acts?
• Workplace factors for each unsafe act?
• Organizational factors (latent conditions) 
contributing to defensive failures and 
workplace factors?
System contributions
(Single or multiple events)
Organizational factors
Failed
defenses
Workplace
factors
Latent condition profile
Aims of HF event analysis
• Identify recurrent error traps
• Identify how and why defenses fail
• Identify upstream ‘pathogens’
• Rectify systemic weaknesses
TAKE HOME MESSAGE: YOU CAN’T CHANGE
THE HUMAN CONDITION, BUT YOU CAN
CHANGE WORKING CONDITIONS.
